The Impact of the Judiciary on Economic Activity: Evidence from India by Chemin, Matthieu
      
Chemin : Department of Economics, University of Quebec at Montreal, case postale 8888, succursale Centre-
Ville, Montréal (Québec) Canada H3C 3P8 and CIRPÉE 
chemin.matthieu@uqam.ca 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cahier de recherche/Working Paper 07-24 
 
 
 
 
 
The Impact of the Judiciary on Economic Activity: Evidence from 
India 
 
 
 
Matthieu Chemin 
 
 
 
 
Septembre/September 2007  
Abstract:   
This paper examines the consequences of slow judiciaries on firms’ contracting 
behaviour in India. After deriving testable implications from a game theoretical model, 
I examine how case pendency rates in India’s state courts affect the contracting 
behaviour of 170,000 small non-agricultural informal firms from the 2000 National 
Sample Survey’s 55th round. I find that a slow judiciary implies more breaches of 
contract, discourages firms from undertaking relationship-specific investments, 
impedes firms’ access to formal financial institutions, and favours inefficient 
dynasties. Moving a firm from the highest to the lowest pendency state would result 
in a 10% improvement in firm performance. 
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In this paper, I examine both theoretically and empirically whether the quality of the
judicial system has implications for the contracting behaviour and economic performance
of rms. Standard neoclassical economics assumes that the judiciary is perfect, fair,
immediate. There always exists a set of prices that enables contracting to achieve Pareto
e¢ ciency, as in the First Welfare Theorem. However, it is clearly understood today
thanks to the contributions by North (1990) that institutions dened as the organisation
of society, the rules of the game, are a major determinant of economic performance.
Property rights institutions protect citizens from various forms of expropriation by
elites and contracting institutionsdetermine the terms and ease of contracting between
citizens.
A number of recent papers suggest that institutions may exert a fundamental impact
on rmscontracting behaviour and hence on aggregate economic performance. Knack
and Keefer (1995) relate professional country risk measures provided by business experts
to their measure of judicial quality which is the amount of contract-intensive money (the
di¤erence between M2 and cash). The intuition is that in a country with a better judi-
ciary, we should see more complicated contracts involving this type of money. However,
there is a problem of endogeneity: richer countries can a¤ord better institutions. Three
papers deal with the endogeneity of institutions using an instrumental variables ap-
proach. Mauro (1995) instruments corruption with ethno-linguistic fragmentation. Hall
and Jones (1999) use distance from the equator as an instrument for social infrastruc-
ture because, they argue, latitude is correlated with western inuence, which leads to
good institutions. Finally, Acemoglu et al (2001) use di¤erences in the mortality rates
of European colonialists to estimate the e¤ect of institutions on economic performance.
The intuition is that in places where Europeans faced high mortality rates, they could
not settle and were more likely to set up extractive institutions. These institutions have
persisted to the present. They nd that the risk of expropriation, instrumented by set-
tlersmortality, negatively a¤ects economic growth today in a cross section of countries.
More recently, Djankov et al (2003) gathered a remarkably detailed dataset on court
performance and procedural formalism in a cross section of 109 countries to show that
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higher procedural formalism determined by legal origin is associated with a less e¢ cient
judiciary.
To date, literature on the links between institutions, contract enforcement and eco-
nomic performance has been largely macroeconomic. In contrast, I will try to move
this literature in a more microeconomic direction. I focus on one specic measure of
institutional quality, the speed of the judiciary, evaluated in an objective fashion. I then
examine how this measure a¤ects contracting behaviour and economic performance in
a large representative sample of small non-agricultural rms in India. This dataset is
unique in the sense that an array of questions were asked to rm owners concerning
breaches of contract, the nature of contracts signed, access to credit and corporate own-
ership. This type of information is typically not available in rm-level datasets. Also, by
working within a single country, I am able to control for a range of factors and inuences
that cannot be as convincingly controlled for in cross country data. In this sense, my
paper is in the spirit of recent works exploiting policy di¤erences across Indian states.
Besley and Burgess (2004), for example, examine how di¤erences in the industrial rela-
tions climate across Indian states a¤ects manufacturing performance. However, in my
case, I have disaggregated information on both contracting behaviour and performance
of small rms in India.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 1 explores the channels through
which the quality of the judiciary impacts on rmseconomic performance. I introduce
explicitly the role of the judiciary in simple models of four prominent aspects in the
life of a rm: breaches of contract, use of relationship-specic investments, access to
credit markets and corporate ownership. Section 2 provides a background on the func-
tioning of the judiciary in India and on the 55th round of the National Sample Survey
of India on non-agricultural informal enterprises. Section 3 presents my method, and
results pertaining to rmscontracting behaviour. Section 4 discusses the e¤ects on rm
performance. Section 5 concludes.
3
1 Theory
1.1 Breaches of Contract
The rst intuitive consequence of an imperfect judiciary would be the modication of
economic agentswillingness to cooperate in previously signed contracts. We know that
the judiciary acts as an important deterrent to any fraud that might be more econom-
ically attractive in the short run. The probability of harsh punishment in monetary or
non-monetary terms would heavily dissuade opportunistic agents to default ex-post on
previous agreements.
Consider a trade relationship between two agents, a buyer and a seller. These two
individuals play a typical Prisoners Dilemma game with perfect information. A good
is traded, of valuation vs to the seller and vb to the buyer. The two players have two
possible strategies: C will denote cooperation (payment for the buyer, delivery for the
seller) and D indicates a deviant behaviour (non-payment after delivery for the buyer,
non-delivery after payment for the seller). We also consider that agents are risk-neutral.
In the event of a default, the agent can sue his partner and regain a fraction  of the
price p of the good1. This fraction  is a measure of the speed of the judicial system and
a value close to 1 indicates an e¢ cient judiciary (see appendix for proof). The payo¤s
for this game are therefore:
Buyer
C (pays) D (does not pay)
Seller C (delivers) p  vs;vb   p p  vs; vb   p
D (does not deliver) p  p; p  p 0; 0
The only dominant strategy for the buyer in the short run is to deviate. Therefore,
no trade is possible in the short run. However, trade is possible in an innitely repeated
game framework where players discount the future at rate  where 0 <  < 1. The
homogeneous intertemporal discount factor  determines agentstastes concerning the
future, their sensitivity to punishment by a court in the future and thus their propensity
to cooperate in a repeated game framework. Suppose that players play according to a
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Grim Trigger strategy which consists in playing C until the other player defaults and
then in playing D as a punishment for the rest of the game. Let s be the seller, b the
buyer; all indices s or b indicate that we refer to the seller or the buyer. The aim is to
determine the set of prices providing incentives to cooperation.
The buyer gets
Pt
i=0 
i(vb  p) if he cooperates until time t, vb p1  if he cooperates for
ever; and
Pt
i=0 
i(vb   p) + (vb   p)t+1 + 0+ ::: if he cooperates until time t and then
defaults at time t+ 1. I assume here that the buyer gets 0 after having defaulted. This
is true if the calculated payo¤ concerns the payo¤ obtained from that particular match.
However, after having breached a contract, a buyer could search for a new partner and
start a new interaction. The results are very similar to the framework developed here.2
Comparing these two payo¤s, we conclude that the buyer will cooperate, as opposed
to deviate, at any time if and only if:
p <
vb
1 + (1  ) (IC buyer)
This is the incentive constraint for the buyer to cooperate and is therefore named IC
buyer. The intuition is that for the buyer to cooperate the price has to be inferior to a
certain level. It is interesting to note that the price threshold depends positively on .
This implies that if the judiciary worsens, then the the buyer will require a lower price
in order to cooperate. The low quality of the judiciary forces the buyer to o¤er a lower
price because of the higher risk of not recovering the payment if the contract is broken.
This can be seen in Figure 1.
Similar reasoning for the seller gives us an incentive constraint IC seller:
p >
vs
+ (1  ) (IC seller)
The intuition is that for the seller to cooperate the price must be superior to a certain
level. The price threshold depends positively on . This implies that if the judiciary
worsens, then the seller will require a higher price in order to cooperate. Again, the
seller claims a certain insurance amount because of the higher risk of not recovering the
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goods if the contract is broken. This can be seen in Figure 2.
These two incentive constraints meet at a certain  in Figure 3, this  being a
function of vs and vb and therefore called 
(vs; vb)3. Under some conditions, this 
 is
between 0 and 1, as in Figure 34. When two agents meet randomly, in the case depicted
in Figure 3, there will be an area of cooperation, but only for some high values of . In
Figure 3, we can see that for  < , there is no possible cooperation. But for  > ,
there exists a set of prices allowing trade to take place. The exact price will then be
determined by the bargaining power of the two agents, its determination being outside
the scope of this paper. The important result is that agents have an incentive to deviate
for low values of the quality  of the judiciary. It is easy to see that (vs; vb) is a
positive function of vs and a negative function of vb. This means that if vs increases or
if vb decreases (trade becomeing less benecial for the agents), then a higher threshold
(vs; vb) is required to do business. In other words, the range of (vs; vb) for which trade
takes place is greater if  is higher. This leads us to Proposition 1:
Proposition 1 Trade takes place only if  > (vs; vb). The range of (vs; vb) for which
trade takes place is greater if  is higher; conversely, more breaches of contract should
be observed if  decreases.
However, one can argue that agents could use business networks if  <  to shield
them from breached contracts. A business network consists in agents sharing private in-
formation about their likelihood of cooperation and using social pressure to ensure that
contracts are respected. Indeed even if the judiciary is defective, a number of recent
papers suggest that informal mechanisms of contract enforcement might ll the gap.
Greif (1993) in particular presents an example of an informal institution, a coalition
of Maghribi traders from the 11th century, in which the commitment problem is sur-
mounted by multilateral punishment mechanisms. A series of theoretical papers tries to
explain the stylised fact of relational contracting in business networks as an endogenous
response to an inadequate legal framework. Kranton (1996) develops an explanation of
reciprocal exchange as a self-sustaining system. Dixit (2003) builds a model based on
6
self-governance as an alternative to o¢ cial law. Even if people do not create business
networks to avoid clogged judiciaries, they could resort to settlements before even turn-
ing to the judiciary. This group of papers suggests that informal contract enforcement
might mitigate the impact courts may have in shaping economic activity. Unfortunately,
I do not have any information in my dataset on business networks or on the nature of
the relationship between business partners. Theoretically, it is possible to build a model
where agents could choose between entering into the anonymous market with the possi-
bility of contract breaches or creating business networks without contract breaches but
with less economic opportunities. Figure 4 shows a situation in which two agents func-
tion in a business network without a judiciary: even at  = 0, they gain from trade.
The condition for this result to hold is vs < vb
2. If we assume heterogeneity in  in the
population, it would hold for high values of  which might concern few people. This re-
sult is in line with the ndings of Dixit (2003). Dixit nds that honesty is self-enforcing
only between pairs of su¢ ciently close neighbours. The extent of self-enforcing honesty
is likely to decrease when the world expands beyond this size. Business networks remain
e¢ cient only in small and close-knit communities where information can be exchanged.
It is illuminating to apply this framework to two other situations: relationship-
specic investment and access to credit markets.
1.2 Relationship-Specic Investment
The previous section demonstrated that more contracts are breached when judiciaries
are of low quality. But one could also expect the quality of judiciaries to impact on the
degree of specicity in relationships between rms. A relationship-specic investment is
dened as an investment made by an agent in order to supply another with a specialised
asset. A specialised asset is itself dened as an asset whose value in current use exceeds
its value in alternative use. A relationship-specic investment is preferred by rms for
obvious reasons of economic specialisation. However, as Klein et al (1978) emphasized,
the possibility of post-contractual opportunistic behaviour arises. Indeed, to induce the
supplier to carry out a relationship-specic investment, a rm can either write a long-
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term contract with favourable terms for the supplier or guarantee exclusivity rights. But
once the costs of the investment are sunk, there is an immediate incentive for the rm
to renege on the contract and capture the suppliersrents. Alternatively, if search costs
to nd a new supplier are high, there is an immediate incentive for the supplier to use
its monopoly power to impose higher prices. These frictions could reduce the incentive
to invest in specialised assets; Klein et al (1978) conclude that vertical integration will
supersede market systems in such cases. But another way to limit post-contractual
opportunistic behaviour is a strong judicial system that enforces contracts properly. I
will now develop a simple model based on the previous game in which the judiciary is
explicitly modelled to evaluate the impact of the quality of the judiciary on the incentive
to invest in specialised assets.
Consider the game described earlier. There are two possibilities for a seller of a good:
either he makes a relationship-specic investment (RSI) of value i with a particular
rm, or produces a good of more widespread use (the opposite of a relationship-specic
investment, RSI) with little or no appropriable rents. The drawback of a relationship-
specic investment is that there is a risk of post-contractual opportunistic behaviour.
Its advantage is the possibility of higher rents. As my analysis focuses arbitrarily on the
seller, I model this as a decrease in production costs for the seller where a relationship-
specic investment is undertaken. The valuation of the good for the buyer is vs with a
relationship-specic investment and Vs without, where Vs > vs. We can calculate the
payo¤s associated with each strategy and compare them.
The seller gets  i+Pti=0 i(pRSI vs) if he cooperates until time t and  i+ pRSI vs1  if
he cooperates for ever. pRSI corresponds to the price determined between seller and buyer
if a relationship-specic investment has been undertaken. The seller gets
Pt
i=0 
i(pRSI 
Vs) if he cooperates until time t and
pRSI Vs
1  if he cooperates for ever in the case where
no relationship-specic investment is undertaken. I assume here that the seller is always
willing to cooperate in order to take advantage of his relationship-specic investment.
The set of prices that give an incentive to the buyer to cooperate will be determined by
looking at the buyers situation.
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The buyer is faced with an alternative: either he cooperates and obtains vb p
1  ; or
he deviates at time t by expropriating the seller and appropriating the total rents and
obtains
Pt
i=0 
i(vb   p) +
P1
i=t+1 
i(vb   vs)  t+1F (vb   vs). However, the seller may
sue him in court, in which case the buyer will have to pay a ne depending positively
on the total rents.5 Comparing these two payo¤s, we obtain the incentive constraint for
the buyer:
p < vs + F (vb   vs)(1  ) (IC buyer)
The buyer cooperates if the price o¤ered by the seller is inferior to this value. This
means that to give incentive to the buyer to cooperate, as opposed to simply expropriat-
ing the seller, the seller must o¤er a su¢ ciently low price. This price function decreases
with respect to . Indeed, if the quality  of the judiciary decreases, then the buyer has
more incentive to expropriate. The seller must therefore o¤er a lower price.
I now assume that the seller will o¤er the price corresponding to that incentive
constraint. It is the lowest price with which the buyer will cooperate under a certain
judiciary  and the highest price with which to make prots. Calculating the payo¤s
for the seller is straightforward in both situations: if a relationship-specic investment
is undertaken, the seller will get  i + F (vb   vs), if not, he will get F (vb   Vs). The
di¤erence between these two payo¤s,  i+[F (vb vs) F (vb Vs)] is a positive function
of .
Proposition 2 relationship-specic investments become less attractive as the quality of
the judiciary decreases.
The intuition is simply that with a weaker judiciary, contracts are less well-enforced,
the risk of post-contractual opportunistic behaviour increases and, as a consequence, the
incentive to supply a particular rm with a specialised asset of no value to other rms
is reduced.
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1.3 Access to credit markets
We may also believe that judicial systems impact on rmsdebt contracts. As Pagano
et al (2002) explain:
"The key function of courts in credit relationships is to force solvent
borrowers to repay when they fail to do so spontaneously. By the same
token, poor judicial enforcement increases the opportunistic behaviour of
borrowers: anticipating that creditors will not be able to recover their loans
easily and cheaply via courts, borrowers will be more tempted to default.
Creditors respond to this strategic behaviour of borrowers by reducing the
availability of credit."
These authors develop a model in which collateral is used as a device to solve credit
rationing. They nd that improving judicial e¢ ciency reduces credit rationing and
expands lending. This paper, however, is concerned with very small rms in India.
Only 4% of the latter have access to formal nancial institutions. Another way for these
rms to nd nance is by using personal relationships. Indeed, some rms get loans
from relatives or business partners. I call this kind of creditor a friend. I now develop
a model based on the trade-o¤ between a friend and a bank, and the impact of the
judiciary on this choice. This will help explain when a rm chooses one over the other
and when its credit is rationed.
Consider an entrepreneur who requires funds to start a project. There are two
funding possibilities: a friend or a bank. All variables are per unit lent. The prot
associated with the project is . The entrepreneur is aware of this safe return. The
interest rate is r (it can be di¤erent according to the source of the loan). The buyer
has again two strategies after having obtained the loan: C for cooperation (repayment)
and D for deviation (non-repayment). An important assumption about the information
structure must be made here:
Assumption: The bank does not know the probability p of the projects success.
On the other hand, the friend and the entrepreneur know that the project will succeed
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and earns the entrepreneur .
I chose this particular assumption in order to underline the di¤erence between bank
and friend. The bank does not know for certain the probability of success but can resort
to the judiciary if needed, whereas the friend cannot resort to the judiciary but has more
information about the entrepreneur. There is an information asymmetry between bank
and entrepreneur. This creates a trade-o¤ for the entrepreneur between the bank and
the friend, which depends on the judiciary. The payo¤s for the entrepreneur are the
following:
Entrepreneur
C (pay) D (do not pay)
Friend 1 + r   1; (1 + )  (1 + r)  1; 1 + 
Bank p(1 + r) + (1  p)c  1; (1 + )  (1 + r) c  1; 1 +    c
The bank estimates that the entrepreneur will succeed with a probability p and there-
fore repay the loan. But with a probability 1  p, the project will fail, the entrepreneur
unlikely to repay the loan and the bank recovering only c. It is then straightforward
to estimate the entrepreneurs di¤erent payo¤s from the two sources of a loan.
It is then straightforward to calculate the payo¤s associated with both strategies for
each loan source and obtain two incentive constraints for the entrepreneur. It is also easy
to see that there exists a threshold  such that if  < , the bank will not lend because
there does not exist an interest rate giving an incentive to the entrepreneur to take out a
loan and be protable for the bank. The entrepreneur has simply too many incentives to
default when he is ned less (c) and the bank considers the return in case of failure too
low. This threshold  is a negative function of collateral c, meaning that only customers
with su¢ ciently high collateral will not be credit rationed. Interestingly, a loan from a
friend becomes relatively more attractive when the judiciary worsens. Indeed, the bank
must charge an interest rate negatively related to the quality of the judiciary. This is
because the bank recovers less in cases of failure and must therefore increase its interest
rate so that the transactions remain protable. It is easy to demonstrate that there
exists a threshold  such that if  < , a loan from a friend is actually cheaper
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than one from the bank. More loans from friends should be observed when judiciaries
worsens.
Proposition 3 Less agents get loans from banks when the quality of judiciaries de-
creases as banks recover less collateral in cases of non-repayment and are thus forced
to charge higher interest rates. More entrepreneurs get loans from friends rather than
banks when judiciaries are slower.
Proof. See appendix for proof.
1.4 Dynastic Management
Dynastic management is the inter-generational transmission of control over assets typical
of family-owned rms. The most comprehensive data on corporate ownership around
the world has been collected by La Porta, De-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), who examine
the control structure of the 20 largest publicly traded companies in 27 (mostly wealthy)
economies in 1995. On average, family ownership across these countries is the control
structure of 30% of companies. The numbers for middle-income countries in the sample
are especially striking: 65% in Argentina, 50% in Greece, 100% in Mexico, 45% in
Portugal. They suggest that widely held corporations are more common in countries
with good legal protection of minority shareholders. In these countries, controlling
shareholders have less fear of being expropriated themselves in the event that they lose
control due to a takeover or market accumulation of shares by a raider. Consequently,
they are more likely to cut their ownership of voting rights by selling shares to raise
funds or to diversify.
However, the rms studied here are small rms with less than ten employees and are
certainly not oated on stock markets. Another explanation, perhaps better adapted to
these rms, is provided by Caselli, Gennaioli (2002). Their reasoning proceeds in two
steps. First, heirs to family rms have no obvious talent for managerial decision making:
dynastic management is a potential source of ine¢ ciency. Second, a rm owner, realising
that his heir is untalented, prefers transfering control to more talented owners or hire
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talented managers. However, imperfect nancial-contract enforcement discourages own-
ership changes for the same reason I developed in the access to credit markets section of
this paper. Imperfect judicial systems in developing countries may cause the prevalence
of family-owned rms and therefore these countriespoor economic performance. Hence:
Proposition 4 There are more family-owned rms in states with ine¢ cient judiciaries.
To conclude the theoretical component of this paper, I expect of states with higher
pendency rates more breaches of contract, less relationship-specic investments, more
di¢ culty accessing credit markets, and more family rms. These predictions are testable
using the dataset I analyse in the following sections.
2 Background
This papers purpose is to relate the quality of the judiciary to rmscontracting be-
haviour. To do this, I use a state-level dataset of the courts. The Judicial institutions
are the same across courts and states. The Indian judiciary operates at three levels:
a single Supreme Court at the federal level; High Courts in each state; and, at lower
levels, district judges for civil cases and sessions judges for criminal cases. India operates
under a common law system which implies that the actions of High Court judges set
precedents for the functioning of subordinate courts in each state.
Data on cases pending in courts indicate that there were 3.1 million cases pending
in 21 High Courts and 20 million in subordinate courts in 2000.6 Examples of judicial
slowness are striking:
the highest court in the country, the Supreme Court, took 11 years to
acquit the headmaster of a school on the charge of taking a bribe for signing
the salary arrears bill of his school. In another case of judicial delay, the
victim was former Union Law Minister, Dr. B.R.Ambedkar. The judgement
came in his lifetime but it took 47 years for the Maharashtra government to
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execute the decree passed in his favour against illegal encroachment of his
land by Pakistani refugees. By then he was dead.7
One reason for judicial delays is a shortage of judges. As Videh Upadhyay, a lawyer
in the Supreme Court of India, states,
the imperative for clearing the burgeoning judicial backlog, and hence for
more judges and Courts, needs to be fully understood. Any lawyer practising
in the Delhi High Court - undoubtedly one of the most important High Courts
of the country - can testify that, on an average 60-70 cases are listed before a
Delhi High Court Judge per day. The sheer quantum of cases forces a judge
to adjourn most of the matters leading to further backlogs. The inevitable
outcome: normal adjournments are for 4-6 months, the trial dates are not
available before 2 years and settlement of suit takes place over 15 years.8
Another reason is the inadequacy of laws in India. Some provisions in place have a
positive impact on the speed of trials. One major positive legal principle is res judicata,
which means that no claim or suit can be brought to court more than once. Another
is the rule governing the transfer of suits forbidding multiple suits in di¤erent places on
the same issue. This statute helps reduce judicial backlog. But other provisions in place
have a negative impact. For instance, the Code of Civil Procedure states that litigants
need not appear in court in person. Litigants may send pleaders instead. But a pleader
cannot accept a brief in lieu of a litigant; hence, pleaders are often sent as a strategy to
delay judgments. Another rule is that plaints must include complete claims. However,
amendments of original pleadings are impossible. Thus, the language of statements is
prolic, allowing for wide interpretations of plaints during proceedings. This reduces the
clarity of plaints.
Speed has thus been identied as a key problem in Indias judiciary, one which
dominates other problems such as fairness, predictability and judicial access. I measure
judicial speed with the pendency percentage, dened as:
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pendency percentage =
cases pending(t)
cases pending(t  1)+cases led
I constructed this index for 1999 from the annual report of Indias Ministry of Law,
Justice and Company A¤airs. This is an incomplete measure since the quality of a
judiciary can also be measured by the fairness of its decisions. However, the measure
I employed here has the advantage of being an objective measure of judicial e¢ ciency.
Overall pendency ( in civil and criminal cases) is an illuminating statistic since it captures
the perceived e¢ ciency of the judicial system and it is this perceived e¢ ciency that a¤ects
rmscontracting behaviour.
An attractive feature of this data is state variation in pendency percentage. This is
due to the common law system, which, compared with civil law, is much less codied.
This liberty enables judiciaries to interpret laws more exibly and to adjust quickly to
new developments. In particular, The Code of Civil Procedure, which denes the rules
of a trial from the ling of a suit to the execution of a verdict, gives judges considerable
discretion in regards to streamlining trails or making them more complex. Thanks to
the common law system, High Courts decisions concerning disputes over statutes of
the Code of Civil Procedure set precedents for respective subordinate courts. This is
why a High Courts ruling can enhance or impair the e¢ ciency of all courts within its
jurisdiction. For example, an order in the Code of Civil Procedure states that a court may
grant an adjournment if su¢ cient cause is shown. The perception of su¢ ciency varies
signicantly among High Courts: the Calcutta High Court decided that the absence of
a lawyer is not a cause to adjourn trial, whereas the Allahabad High Court granted a
similar request. This example is particularly interesting since it shows that di¤erent
interpretations of the same law in di¤erent states have an impact on judicial speed.9
It is often claimed that the judicial system has only a limited impact on the economy
since people resort to alternative dispute resolution institutions, particularly informal
ones. Koehling (2002) describes two types of such informal institutions in India: Pan-
chayats and rural planning commissions. Both institutions play a crucial role in settling
and avoiding rural disputes. The Panchayats, with their limited judicial authority, are
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used to settle disputes over land usage, tenure and commons. As locally-bound institu-
tions, they are highly e¢ cient since they are familiar with situations and litigants at the
village level. Correspondingly, the level of acceptance among the population is high. In
dispute resolutions, Panchayats may impose only limited sanctions, but social pressure
created by judgements serves as a strong incentive to comply. Rural planning com-
missions submit proposals for infrastructure projects such as water dwelling and road
improvement to the respective states authorities. Their involvement ensures broad par-
ticipation on the part of a¤ected populations, and provides the basis for the distribution
of public goods and services according to the needs of the poor. They are the rst
contact point for administrative complaints, and thus prevent disputes before projects
are implemented. I therefore collected information on the number of these entities, and
used this as a control in my regressions.
My aim here is to relate these measures of judicial e¢ ciency to rmscontract be-
haviour. To do this, I will now turn to a representative sample of 170,000 small informal
rms in India. This dataset is the 55th round of the National Sample Survey in In-
dia collected in 1999/2000 for small non-agricultural rms.10 Several characteristics of
this dataset make it appropriate for use in identifying the impact of judicial delays on
contracting behaviour. First, a detailed list of problems experienced by the rm was
collected. Each rm reported whether it found the non-recovery of service charges, fees
or credit to be a major obstacle to its operation. I interpret this problem as a breach
of contract. Second, a detailed questionnaire about the type of contracts used is also
available. I know whether or not the rm operated on a contract basis, and if so, the
type of contract it used. For example, I know whether the equipment and raw mate-
rials were self-procured, supplied by the master unit/contractor, or both. I also know
if the design was specied by the contractor. Third, I have information about access
to credit markets. Each rm was asked whether it found the shortage of capital to
be a major problem to its operation. Related to this, a wealth of information on the
source of loans is reported. I know whether the loan was granted from a central and
state-level term lending institution, a government (central, state or local), public sector
16
banks, commercial banks, other institutional agencies, money lenders, business partners,
suppliers/contractors, or friends and relatives. Fourth, I have information on rm own-
ership, whether it is a partnership with household members or not. Finally, a wide range
of more conventional information is also available for each rm: the full characteristics
of all employees, the rms capital stock and factor incomes, the source and destination
of the rms nal product, and the sector in which the rm is operating (according to
the 5-digit level in the National Industry Classication).
3 Methods and Results
To relate judicial e¢ ciency to contracting behaviour, I perform regressions of the form:
yijs = 0 + ps + sZs + ijsXijs + jdj + "ijs
where i corresponds to the rm, j to the sector studied, and s to the state. The variable
yijs represents the outcome variable of interest; this will rst be the rms contracting
behaviour, and later its performance. In this specication, determinants of the outcome
include a constant (0), the pendency percentage (ps), a vector of state-level controls
(Zs), a vector of rm-level controls (Xijs) and sector-xed e¤ects (dj). The coe¢ cient
of interest is therefore .
My research design begins with a simple examination of the correlation between
contracting behaviour outcomes and pendency percentages, and then incrementally adds
control variables to that regression in order to check the robustness of the result.
State-level controls (Zs)11 consist of the following: state gross domestic product per
capita and per capita income growth rate (to control for overall economic development);
state school enrolment and literacy rates (to control for educational attainment); state
amount of credit per capita (to control for the nancial sectors overall development);
state expenditure on state organs and the unit cost per policemen (to control for that
part of the state budget devoted to enforcing law and order); state length of roads
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per capita and access to safe drinking water (to control for infrastructure quality); and
nally, state death rates and state male life expectancy (to control for health sector
development).
Firm-level variables (Xijs)12 consist of the following: indebtedness (to control for
the disciplinary e¤ect of increased indebtedness on the use of available funds); the level
of interest payments as a proportion of rmsprots (to control for the likelihood of
bankruptcy); the amount of capital accruing from nancial institutions (to control for
the ability of rms to gain access to sources of nancing); the proportion of temporary
to total employment in the rm (to control for for labour productivity13); the owners
gender (to control for gender-specic e¤ects on rm performance14; the number of un-
related other activities undertaken by the owner (to control for time spent on the rms
activities); and nally, whether or not the rm is registered (to control for the businesss
level of informality).
I also include sector dummies (dj) to control for sector-specic e¤ects. I use sim-
ple probit regressions when the outcome is a dummy variable. I do not expect much
endogeneity since there is no reverse causality between a small rm of less than ten em-
ployees15 and the quality of the judiciary. I use robust standard errors and a clustered
sampling strategy at the level of the state because I include state-level variables in a
micro-econometric survey (Moulton, 1990).
3.1 Basic Results
Table 1 examines the relationship between contracting behaviour and the quality of
the judiciary. The dependent variable is the occurrence of contract breaches and the
sole determinant is the pendency percentage. The dependent variable was obtained
from a list of problems commonly experienced by rms. One such problem is the non-
recovery of service charges/ fees/ credit. This relates to cases in which a breach of
contract has occured. I therefore construct a dummy variable equal to 1 in cases where
the rm experienced this type of problem as one of its main problems, and 0 if it did
not. I calculate in column (1) a simple correlation between these two variables. I
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incrementally add state-level control variables in column (2), rm-level control variables
in column (3) and sector dummy variables in column (4). The results are all statistically
signicant, a fact that strengthens the claim that there is a signicant relationship
between pendency rates and the contracting behaviour of rms. This result is consistent
with proposition 1. Column (4) of Table 1 indicates that if the pendency percentage
increases by one percentage point, then the probability that the rm will experience
a breach of contract will increase by 0.1 percent. This result is somewhat weak and,
although statistically signicant, seems economically insignicant. However, the ranges
of pendency percentages in India must be kept in mind. In 1999, the pendency percentage
variation among states was between 45% and 90%. The following interpretation of the
coe¢ cient  can therefore be devised. Based on the coe¢ cients of the regression and
using the standard cumulative normal function, which is the denition of the probit
function, the probability that an average rm in the average state will experience a
breach of contract, where the pendency percentage is 45%, can be estimated. I estimated
the same quantity for the average rm in the average state with a pendency percentage
of 90%. The di¤erence between these two probabilities is 5 percentage points. The
results can be interpreted in the following way: the probability that the average rm in
the average state will experience a breach of contract is 5 percentage points higher if the
pendency percentage varies from the lowest rate to the highest rate in India.
Table 2 examines the nature of contracts as a function of judicial quality. The
dependent variable represents whether or not a rm operates on a contractual basis and
the explanatory variable represents the pendency percentage. As discussed earlier, the
dataset contains detailed information on the contractual environment in which these
rms operate. I thus constructed a dummy variable equal to 1 in cases where the rm
worked on a contract basis and 0 if it did not. Column (1) of Table 2 indicates no
relationship between the quality of the judiciary and that variable. This may be due to
the fact that only 7 percent of the rms in the dataset operate on a contractual basis.
However, instead of evaluating the impact of the judiciary on the number of contracts
entered into, it is more instructive to assess the impact of the judiciary on contract
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design. The dataset contains additional information on the nature of these contracts.
In particular, rms were asked three questions: was the design of the product specied
entirely by the contractor, was the equipment provided by the master unit, and were the
raw materials provided by the master unit. I dene a contract as a relationship-specic
investment contract in cases where these three questions were answered a¢ rmatively.
The denition of a relationship-specic investment is an investment of capital that could
not be used in another activity, or if so used would result in a signicant loss of value.
In columns (2) to (5) of Table 2, I consider only rms working on a contract basis, some
of which signed a relationship-specic investment contract. By reducing the size of the
sample, I hope to pinpoint a signicant relationship between the quality of the judiciary
and the likelihood of signing relationship-specic investment contracts. I incrementally
add control variables from column (2) to column (5). Column (5) illustrates that fewer
relationship-specic investment contracts are signed in states with higher pendency rates.
This provides support for proposition 2. An economic interpretation of this result is that
the average rm in the average state is 4 percentage points less likely to undertake a
relationship-specic investment if the judiciary is the slowest of India as opposed to the
fastest.
Table 3 examines the inuence of the judiciary on rmsaccess to credit markets.
The dependent variable is information on loans and the explanatory variable of interest
is the pendency percentage. The dependent variable used in the regression of column(1)
is a dummy variable equal to 1 in cases where the rm experienced a shortage of capital
as one of its problems, and 0 otherwise. A higher pendency means more problems of
this type. This result can be interpreted in the following way: the probability that the
average rm in the average state will experience a shortage of capital increases by 7
percentage points if the judiciary is the slowest as opposed to the fastest. In column (2),
the dependent variable represents whether or not the rm had an outstanding loan at
the time of the survey. I found that fewer rms have outstanding loans where the rate
of pendency is higher. The average rm in the average state will nd it 3.5 percentage
points harder to get a loan with the slowest judiciary in India, relative to the fastest. An
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interesting test is to rene the analysis to factor in the exact source of the loan. Column
(3) demonstrates that it is 2 percentage points harder to obtain a loan from formal
nancial institutions in states with slow judiciaries. As predicted, column (4) shows
that it is harder to secure a loan from strangers (suppliers, contractors, moneylenders)
although the statistical signicance of this result is not very high. Since there are very
few rms in the category where loans are from friends, relatives and business partners
(column (5)), I thus restricted attention to the sample of rms having obtained a loan.
In this subset, column (5) demonstrates that loans are more likely to come form friends,
relatives, and business partners when the judiciary is slow. This agrees with the notion
that people tend to operate in small business networks in areas where pendency rates
are higher. The average rm having obtained a loan is 16 percentage points more likely
to have obtained it from a relative than from other sources in states where the judiciary
is the slowest, as opposed to the quickest. This result is consistent with Proposition 3,
which holds that agents obtain more loans from friends and less from banks in situations
where there is a slow judiciary.
Table 4 looks at the nature of rm ownership as a function of judicial quality. I
restrict the sample to rms engaged in partnerships as opposed to single-ownership rms,
as partnerships rms provide further data on relationships between partners. There are
two possible types of partnership: partnership with members of the same household and
partnership between members not all from the same household. Dynastic management
corresponds to the rst category. Control variables are added incrementally in the four
columns. Column (4) illustrates that there are more partnerships with members of the
same household in states with slow judiciaries. The average rm engaged in a partnership
in the average state is 9 percentage points more likely to be a family rm if the judiciary
is the slowest as compared to the fastest. This is consistent with Proposition 4, which
states that family rms should be more prevalent in states with slower judiciaries.
These basic results can be rened using the methodology of Rajan and Zingales
(1998). The intuition is that a good judicial system should disproportionately help
rms typically dependent on the judicial system for their growth. I will construct the
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test as follows. A sectors need for the judicial system is identied from data on U.S.
rms. Need for the judicial system will be measured by these rmsvertical integration.
A highly vertically integrated rm does not rely on the judicial system since all activities
are internalized. A non vertically integrated rm, in contrast, relies on many suppliers or
customers and is therefore more dependent on the judicial system. Vertical integration
of rms will be measured by the ratio of the value added generated in the rm to the
total sales. An indicator of 1 means that all value creation comes from within the rm.
An indicator of 0 means that a rm is not highly vertically concentrated. Following
Rajan and Zingales (1998), I make two very important assumptions. First, I consider
that the judicial system is optimal in the United States. This method allows me to
identify a sectors technological demand for a judicial system. Second, I assume that this
technological demand carries over to other countries. I then examine whether industries
more dependent on judicial systems experience more problems of breach of contract,
undertake fewer relationship-specic investments, su¤er from capital shortages or are
more likely to be family rms.
Data for vertical integration in the US was gathered from the Industrial Statistics
Database 2003 at the 3- and 4-digit level of the ISIC Code (Revision 3) put together
by the United Nations Statistical Division.16 I then constructed the interaction between
the demand for justice (dened as 1 minus the vertical integration) at the NIC2 level
and the pendency percentage.
Table 5 column (1) and (2) show no signicant impact. In Table 5 column (3), the
dependent variable is the occurrence of a shortage of capital. It can be seen that a rm
operating in a sector which is dependent on the judicial system in the USA su¤ers more
from a slow judiciary than a rm operating in a sector not dependent on the judiciary.
In column (4), the dependent variable is the likelihood of being a family rm. We see
that a rm in a sector dependent on the judicial system in the US is more likely to
be family run than a rm in a sector not dependent on the judiciary. I veried that
my results did not depend on the choice of benchmark country by gathering data for
Canada. The last four columns of table 5 show that the result is comparable and in
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accordance to expectations.
This extension provides the additional insight that the e¤ect of the judiciary depends
on ta rms demand for justice by a rm. Sectors typically more dependent on judiciaries
su¤er more from judicial ine¢ ciency.
3.2 Robustness checks
To lend support to the previous set of estimates, I will now perform a series of robustness
checks.
The rst robustness check concerns the e¢ ciency measure of the judicial system. It
must be determined whether or not the results obtained are sensitive to the particular
measure of judicial quality used. Table 6 looks at the relationship between occurrences of
breaches of contract and judicial quality using various measures of judicial quality as an
explanatory variable. I used successively in column (1) to (6) the pendency percentage
of total cases in High Courts in 1999 (from Annual Report, Ministry of Law, Justice and
Company A¤airs); the pendency percentage of total cases in High Courts in 1998 (same
source); the expected duration of trials in High Courts in 1996 (measured in number of
pending cases at the beginning of the period plus number of led cases within the year
divided by the number of cases disposed of within the year from Law commission reports,
Annual Reports of the Ministry of Law and Justice); the corresponding pendency rate
in 1996 (dened as 1-1/duration); the expected duration of a trial in High Court in
1995; and the corresponding pendency rate in 1995. Columns (1) to (6) of Table 6 show
that the positive result remains unchanged even while the pendency rate is measured at
di¤erent times, from di¤erent sources or relating to other types of cases.
A potential problem in using the pendency rate as a measure of judicial quality is
the possibility of out of court settlements. If contracting parties are aware that they are
unlikely to achieve an expeditious verdict, they may be more inclined to resolve disputes
by way of settlement. This could articially reduce the backlog of cases treated by the
judiciary. The pendency rate may be inuenced by settlements and a low pendency rate
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would thus not be evidence of an e¢ cient judiciary.
A similar problem might arise if the assumption made in Section 1.1, regarding
random matchings between seller and buyer, is relaxed. It could be argued that, faced
with a slow judicial system, a seller would seek to acquire information about his partner
in order to resolve information asymmetry. This would enable him to deal only with
patient and cooperative agents, thereby creating a business network, as opposed to the
anonymous market where players are matched randomly. Kali (1999) develops a theory
of business networks in which the latter are endogenous to the reliability of the legal
system. He nds that the existence of networks exerts a negative e¤ect on the functioning
of the anonymous market. This is because networks absorb honest individuals, raising
the density of dishonest individuals engaged in anonymous market exchange. If agents
could self-select in small groups where information is shared and no default occurs, this
would surely reduce the number of breaches of contract in the economy, unclog the
judiciary and make it articially e¢ cient. In this case again, a low pendency rate would
not be evidence of an e¢ cient judiciary.
These two points of criticism arise from the fact that the measure of judicial e¢ ciency
used relates to the demand for, as well as the supply of, justice. Indeed, the pendency
rate is dened as:
pendency percentage =
pending(t)
pending(t  1)+led
Considering the following identity:
pending(t  1)+led=pending(t)+solved
the pendency percentage can be rewritten as:
pendency percentage =
pending(t  1)+led-solved
pending(t  1)+led
This expression of the pendency percentage includes the quantity of cases led. The
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pendency rate depends both on how many cases were resolved (the supply of justice)
and the number of new cases brought before the courts (the demand for justice). I am
interested in the e¤ect of the supply of justice on rmscontracting behaviour, but this
e¤ect here is confounded by the demand for justice. In particular, if the number of new
cases increases, the pendency rate goes up. An increasing pendency rate is not evidence
of an increasingly ine¢ cient judiciary but merely reects the litigious nature of agents.
To solve this particular problem, a measure of judicial e¢ ciency focusing more on
the supply side of justice can be employed. I considered the following indicator:
solved
pending
This indicator only reects the capacity of judges to solve cases. A high ratio indicates
that many pending cases are being treated. Column (7) of Table 6 shows that this
indicator is positively correlated with breaches of contract. In fact, I nd that all results
presented in this paper are robust to the use of this alternative measure of judicial
e¢ ciency. This conrms the conclusion that the e¢ ciency of the judiciary in dealing
with pending cases a¤ects the contracting behaviour of rms.
In order to explain the similarity of the results, it is necessary to look at the determi-
nants of cases led and cases pending in India. Column (1) of Table 7 demonstrates that
the number of cases pending per judge does not depend on the number of cases led per
judge. This result would be characteristic of a judicial system in which judges solve more
cases as the number of cases led increases in order to keep constant the amount of cases
pending. This is conrmed in Column (2) of Table 7 where the number of cases disposed
per judge is positively correlated, by a one-to-one ratio, with the number of cases led
per judge. The number of cases pending cannot be explained by the number of cases
registered. Other operational factors such as scarceness of means are more important in
determining the amount of cases pending. An indicator of the means scarceness is the
number of judges required for a well-functioning judiciary in any state. This indicator is
positively correlated with the number of cases pending as can be seen in column (3) of
Table 7. The conclusion drawn from Table 7 is that the number of cases pending does
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not depend on the number of cases led. Therefore, if less cases are led due to out of
court settlements or the creation of business networks, this would not have an impact
on the number of cases pending.17
Another concern is that the judicial system is inconsequential as rms endeavour to
avoid it by using alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. The impact of the latter
may be measured by the number of Panchayats per capita and the number of rural
planning commissions per capita. Although such numbers do not reect the quality of
the institutions themselves, they do indicate whether the system works in the respective
state or not, as the majority of institutions are not imposed by the government and thus
only come into existence when supported by the population itself. Table 8 includes the
number of Panchayats and rural planning commissions as additional state controls. In
column (1), the dependent variable is the occurrence of breaches of contract. We see
that the pendency percentage variable retains its signicance. Surprisingly, the num-
ber of Panchayats is positively associated with the probability of experiencing a breach
of contract. The number of planning commissions is insignicant. In column (2), the
dependent variable is the probability of a rm undertaking a relationship-specic invest-
ment. The quality of the judiciary loses its statistical signicance and the coe¢ cient
remains negative. In column (3), the dependent variable is the shortage of capital. Here
again, the quality of the judiciary retains its signicance and the number of Panchayats
enters with a positive sign. In Column (4), the dependent variable is the probability that
the rm is a family rm. Only the pendency percentage is signicant. The conclusion
from this table is that even if alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are controlled
for, the pendency percentage remains signicant.
4 E¤ects on Firm Performance
This paper seeks to determine whether pendency rates a¤ect not only rm-level con-
tracting behaviour but also rm-level performance. The dependent variable is now the
growth status of the rm. It is a subjective measure since it was asked directly of rm
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owners. It is a dummy variable equal to one if the rm is expanding or constant, to zero
if the rm is shrinking.
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 9 show the reduced form relationship between the pen-
dency rate and rm performance. There is a signicant negative relationship between
the pendency rate and rm performance even when control variables are incrementally
added. From Table 9 column (4), we see that the e¤ect on economic performance is con-
siderable. The average rm in the average state will be less likely by 10 percentage points
to expand if the judiciary is the slowest as opposed to the quickest in India. In Column
(5), I included variables corresponding to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.
We saw that the pendency percentage remains signicant and that other variables are
insignicant. I also carried out the robustness checks of Section 3. I used di¤erent mea-
sures for both pendency percentage and the e¢ ciency of the judiciary (solved/pending)
and found similar results.
I also applied the methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998) to rm performance.
The intuition is that good judiciaries disproportionately help rms typically dependent
on the judicial system for growth. We can see from Table 10 column (1) that Indian
rms involved in sectors more dependent on judiciaries in the USA grow less in states
with ine¢ cient judiciaries. Another possibility is that rms may simply move to other
states or that people decide not to undertake judicially dependent activities. Column
(2) of Table 10 investigates the relationship between the number of rms in a particular
sector depending on their demand for justice calculated in the USA interacted with
the quality of the judiciary. There are signicantly less rms in sectors requiring good
judicial systems in states where judicial system are defective. Unfortunately, this does
not allow me to discriminate between the two hypotheses of occupational choice or
mobility. Having no data on migration, I do not know if people decide not to undertake
judiciary-dependent activities or if they move to other states, though it is clear that
bad judicial systems certainly have an impact on rms in regards to their industrial
organization. As in Section 3, these ndings are robust to the use of Canadian data
(columns (3) and (4)).
27
5 Conclusion
This paper has shown that the quality of judicial institutions in Indian states matters
for both small rmscontracting behaviour and economic performance of small rms.
My ndings are in line with an emerging, largely macroeconomic literature (Djankov
et al (2002), Acemoglu et al (2001), Rodrik et al (2002), for example), underlining the
importance of institutions in economic performance. My rm-level data is unique in the
sense that it contains much information on non-recovery of service charges/fees/credit,
contract design, whether a rm is capital constrained, sources of borrowing and forms
of ownership. This type of information is typically not available in most rm-level
databases.
When I related these specic measures to state pendency rates, I found that slower
judiciaries are associated with more breaches of contract, less relationship-specic in-
vestments, a greater shortage of capital, less access to formal nancial institutions and
a preference for family ownership of rms. These results indicate that the quality of
judiciaries across Indian states plays an important role in shaping economic activity in
this important sector of the economy. Moreover, I found that having slower courts is
negatively associated with rm performance. My results are consistent with a simple
game theoretic model illustrating how slower judiciaries a¤ect agentsbehaviour in con-
tracting relationships. This theorys key insights are that rm owners in slow judiciary
environments are more likely to break contracts, less likely to engage in relationship-
specic investment, more likely to be credit constrained, less likely to have access to
formal credit and more likely to keep rms under family ownership.
This research leaves important questions open. First, we would like, for example, to
know more about what determines judicial speed. In particular, we would like to identify
specic policy measures which would enhance judicial e¢ ciency. This is a problem both
for India and for many countries su¤ering under slow courts (Djankov et al, 2003). A
key implication from this paper is that the quality of the judiciary has signicant e¤ects
on economic performance. Finding specic means of speeding up courts is therefore an
important area for future work. In India, the common law system seems to suggest that
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the actions of High Court judges may be an important determinant of judicial speed.
Linking the rulings of these judges to court functioning is an area of research I plan to
take up in the future. Another unanswered question concerns whether the e¤ects of a
slow judiciary vary across sectors of an economy. One can imagine for example that
rms in Indias registered or formal manufacturing sector may have fewer contracting
problems than informal rms I examined in this paper. In future work, I plan to extend
my analysis to rms in other sectors of the Indian economy as a means of testing this
hypothesis.
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Notes
1Although it could be argued that the buyer could get vb, the court does not observe
that value and can therefore only compensate the buyer with the amount observed on
the market. This claim follows in fact exactly the Sale of Goods Act (1930), chapter
6, article 55: Where under a contract of sale the property in the goods has passed to
the buyer and the buyer wrongfully neglects or refuses to pay for the goods according
to the terms of the contract, the seller may sue him for the price of the goods (italics
added). Moreover, if the claimant could obtain compensation amounting to more than
vb, he would be better o¤ by becoming a professional claimant, earning more than what
he would have earned without the breach of contract. We will not consider this perverse
e¤ect here.
2Explicitely, we could model the payo¤ from deviating at time t with a recurring
expression such as U =
Pt
i=0 
t(vb   p) + (vb   p)t+1 + t+1U where at time t+ 1, the
buyer could start over with another partner. However, it is clear from this expression
that the buyer always has an incentive to deviate as he is ned p < p. An improved
version would be: U =
Pt
i=0 
t(vb   p) + t+1vb   (
P1
i=t+1 
t(p   vs)) + t+1U . This
expression imposes a heavier ne on the buyer in the sense that he has to compensate for
the future gains of trade the seller would have made from this relationship.In this case,
the results are exaclty similar to the results obtained from the simple case explained in
the paper.
3The exact formula of (vs; vb) is: 
(vs; vb) =
vs(1+) vb2
vs+vb(1 ) .
4These conditions are vs(1+ ) > vb
2 and vs < vb. These conditions are simultane-
ously possible for some values of vs, vb and .
5The function F could well be identity. The amount of the ne would be
P1
i=t+1 
i(vb 
vs). It would correspond to the full discounted amount of the total prots. If the
judiciary is perfect and  = 1, then the prots made by the buyer after expropriation
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are 0. This would seem a fair ne to impose on the buyer.
Damages in contract law seek to put the injured party in the position he would
have been in had the contract been performed satisfactorily. The award is made on the
estimated loss directly resulting from the ordinary course of events since the breach. In
contract law, future economic loss is a source of compensation.
This modern English law stems from the judgment of Alderson B in Hadley v Bax-
endale (1854) in which the rule was said to consist of two limbs. To be recoverable,
damages should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising natu-
rally, ie according to the usual course of things, from such a breach of contract itself, or
such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties
at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of its breach.
6Laws Delays: Arrears in Courts, 85th Report, Department-related parliamentary
standing committee on Home a¤airs, Parliament of India, Rajya Sabha. http://rajyasabha.nic.in/
book2/reports/home_a¤/85threport%20.htm
7Krishnamoorty, Dasu, Judicial Delays, Indolink, editorial analysis, 2003
8Upadhyay Videh, More cases, more judges, more courts, India Together, 2003.
9See Koehling (2002) for a more extensive analysis of the Indian judiciary.
10See the Data Appendix for details on variables and an outline of the sampling design.
11See the Data Appendix for the exact denition and sources of the variables.
12See the Data Appendix for the exact denition and sources of the variables.
13The expected e¤ect of this variable on productivity is ambiguous. It is possible that
there are greater incentives for a rm to earmark resources for investment in human cap-
ital in cases of full-time working relationships. Alternatively, temporary labour might
provide a rm with increased exibility to adapt to changes in its environment. Fur-
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thermore, it could be argued that temporary workers have an incentive to make greater
e¤orts in the hope of becoming permanent.
14The impact of female ownership on rm performance is ambiguous. Many studies
indicate that businesses owned by women underperform those owned by men. One
di¢ culty women face in operating small businesses is family responsibilities, which limit
their working hours.
1555% of the rms in the dataset used in this paper have one worker.
16I restrict the sample to manufacturing rms following Rajan and Zingales (1998).
17Note that the pendency percentage collapses to an indicator similar to the previous
one if the number of cases solved is equal to the number of cases led.
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Appendix
A1. Why is  a measure of the speed of the judiciary?
Let us call Ucourt the utility a buyer can retrieve from taking the seller to court. E
corresponds to the expected value.
Ucourt = E(net gain) = E(gain)  E(cost of litigation)
E(gain) = E(T 1G)
G corresponds to the gross gain:
G : gross gain =

p with probability w
0 with probability 1  w

T being the time at which a decision is reached (a random variable), and pt the proba-
bility that the decision is reached at t.
Therefore, E
 
T 1

=
P1
t=1 pt
t 1, and the expected gain is:
E(gain) = wp
1X
t=1
pt
t 1
Here I make two assumptions. The rst is that w, the probability of winning, is
independent of time; the predictability of the decision is thus not a¤ected by time. I
will not focus on predictability in this model and will later equate w to 1 for the buyer.
The second assumption is that the value of punishment pn is independent of time. I
could also consider that the verdict takes into account the time spent in court, but for
simplicitys sake I will ignore this aspect. Now to the cost of litigation:
E(cost of litigation) = E(ca +
t=TX
t=1
ct
t 1 + CT 1)
ca represents the cost of access to justice and ct regular expenses during a trial (lawyer
fees). In the rest of this paper, I will consider this cost ct as a constant c, with a
gross cost C incurred at the end of the trial. I introduce these three types of cost to
emphasize common features of the judicial system. First, a xed cost represents the
initial barrier caused by information from the claimant. Second, a xed cost per period
represents regular expenses. This cost decreases with the speed of the judiciary: a
rapid judiciary would lower these costs. Third, a cost occuring at the end of the trial
represents a consequence of local legislations stating that losers and/or winners must pay
the cost of the trial. This cost increases with judicial e¢ ciency. Slow judiciaries make
the occurrence of such costs appear so distant as to be almost irrelevant. The second
and third costs illustrate the trade-o¤ in any trial: defendants want trials over quickly
so as to avoid paying high lawyer fees, but they also want to slow down the process so
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as to avoid paying nes. Using these renements:
E(cost of litigation) = E(ca + c
t=TX
t=1
t 1 + (wcw + (1  w)cl) T 1)
with cost cw if the individual in question wins and cost cl if he loses. Thus:
E(cost of litigation) = ca +
c
1   (1  
1X
t=1
pt
t 1) + (wcw + (1  w)cl)
1X
t=1
pt
t 1
and therefore:
Ucourt = wpn
1X
t=1
pt
t 1   ca   c
1   (1  
1X
t=1
pt
t 1)  (wcw + (1  w)cl)
1X
t=1
pt
t 1
I will now make some simplifying assumptions. First, I assume a distribution for the
time in which the decision is reached. Specically, I assume a geometric law with factor
. Thus  is the probability that the decision would be reached at t had it been not
reached at t  1. Following this assumption, pt = (1  )t 1. The intuition behind this
distribution is that a high  would correspond to a rapid judiciary. In extreme cases,
where  = 1, the decision would be reached immediately. A low  would indicate a slow
judiciary. Thus:
1X
t=1
pt
t 1 =

 + 1  
With (1  ) < 1, the sum converges. Note that a patient player ( = 1) will have

+1  = 1, meaning that regardless of judicial performance, he will receive compensa-
tion. An impatient player ( = 0) will have 
+1  = , meaning that his compensation
will be discounted due to the speed of the judicial system.
I also assume, to simplify matters even more, that ca = 0, cw = 0 (in which the
winner does not pay anything), w = 1 (in which the claimant, or buyer, wins for sure,
the justice being fair), and c = 0 (no cost of trial). Therefore:
Ucourt() = E(netgain) =
p
 + 1  
If  is dened as 
+1  , Ucourt() can then be rewritten as:
Ucourt() = p
The intuition behind this expression is that if  = 1 (the ideal instantaneous judicial
system) then Ucourt(1) = p which is the exact amount the buyer has had taken from him.
If  = 0 (an interminably slow justice system) then Ucourt(0) = 0. Note that Ucourt()
is an increasing function of . To be completely rigorous in Section 1, I should consider
the fact that  depends also on . The intuition behind this being that patient players
will be rewarded even when the judiciary is slow. However, to simplify the algebra in
this paper, I will only consider .
A2. Proof of proposition 3
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Proposition 3: Less agents obtain loans from banks when judicial quality decreases,
as banks recover less collateral in cases of non-repayment, forcing them to charge higher
interest rates. More entrepreneurs obtain loans from friends as opposed to banks when
judiciaries are slower.
The game is as described in Section 1.3:
Entrepreneur
C (pay) D (do not pay)
Friend 1 + r   1; (1 + )  (1 + r)  1; 1 + 
Bank p(1 + r) + (1  p)c  1; (1 + )  (1 + r) c  1; 1 +    c
If an entrepreneur obtains a loan from a friend, he understandably wants to default
in the short run. However, the possibility of a long term relationship and repeated loans
persuade him to cooperate. An entrepreneur will get
Xt
i=0
i(  r) + t+1(1 + ) if he
cooperates until time t and then deviates at time t+1. He would have received  r
1  had
he collaborated forever. Comparing these two payo¤s, we know that an entrepreneur
will always repay if and only if r < (+1)  1 = rfriend. This is similar to an incentive
constraint for the entrepreneur: the friend must charge such an interest rate in order
to induce the entrepreneur to cooperate. The friend as a prot maximiser will charge
rfriend.
Given this interest rate, the friends expected protability is
X1
i=0
irfriend =
rfriend
1  =
(+1) 1
1  . However, this expected protability must exceed the friends cost of raising
funds r. So the friend must ensure that ( + 1)  1 = rfriend > r.
But one must also consider banks. An entrepreneur will obtain
Xt
i=0
i(   r) +
t+1(1 +   c) if he cooperates until time t and then deviates at time t+ 1. He would
have received  r
1  had he collaborated forever. Comparing these wo payo¤s, we know
that the entrepreneur will always repay if and only if r <    (1  )(1  c). This is
similar to an incentive constraint for the entrepreneur: the bank must charge such an
interest rate to induce the entrepreneur to cooperate.
If the bank respects this condition, the entrepreneur will cooperate. The banks
payo¤ associated with this loan will thus be p(1+r)+(1 p)c 1
1  , which corresponds to the
payo¤ associated with a repaying entrepreneur discounted over time. Again, this must
be superior to the cost r of raising funds.The incentive constraint for the bank is thus:
p(1 + r) + (1  p)c  1 > r or r >  p (1 p)c+1+r
p
.
This is exactly the same situation as in Section 1.1. The incentive constraint for the
entrepreneur is a positive relationship between r and . The incentive constraint for
the bank is a negative relationship between r and . The intersection (r; ) can under
some conditions occur for 0 <  < 1, with  = 1+r p(+1)
c(1 p) .
The conclusion for this model is that for  < , the bank will not lend to this
particular entrepreneur. This is credit rationing. It is interesting to note that the
amount of collateral c has an impact on this limit  with @c
@ < 0. This simply implies
that increasing the amount of collateral can lower the threshold below which no credit
is granted, or alternatively that banks will require more collateral to compensate for
slower judiciaries.
An additional result comes from the comparison between an entrepreneurs two loan
sources. Let us now assume that banks act in a competitive manner and set their interest
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rates so that their prots equal to zero. Thus, no credit is granted for  < , but the
interest rate is r =  p (1 p)c+1+r
p
for  >  (equality in the incentive constraint of the
bank). It can be shown that rbank > rfriend ,  <  1 p1 p = .
The conclusion is that banks will lend to entrepreneurs only if  > , entrepreneurs,
however, will nd this more attractive than borrowing from friends only if  > . In
other words, more entrepreneurs switch to friends when judiciaries are slow.
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Cooperation
Deviation
price
Quality of the
judiciary
ICb
Figure 1: price o¤ered by the buyer as a function of the quality of the judiciary in
order to cooperate (ICb: Incentive Constraint of the buyer)
ICs
Cooperation
Deviation
price
Quality of the
judiciary
Figure 2: price asked by the seller as a function of the quality of the judiciary in order
to cooperate (ICs: Incentive Constraint of the seller)
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ICs
ICb
Figure 3: a potential matching between two individuals and the zone of cooperation
price
Quality of the
judiciary
Cooperation
ICs
ICb
Figure 4: a matching between two individuals who could work in a business network
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Table 1: The impact of pendency on the occurrence of contract breaches
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable non-recovery of service charges, fees, credit
pendency percentage of total 0.1546 0.0948 0.1012 0.1113
cases in High Courts in 1999 (3.03)*** (2.82)*** (3.00)*** (4.28)***
state-level controls no yes yes yes
rm-level controls no no yes yes
sector dummies (NIC2) no no no yes
Observations 176130 176130 172533 172484
 non-recovery of service charges, fees, credit: =1 if the entreprise experienced a major problem of
non-recovery of service charges, fees, credit; =0 otherwise. Probit regressions. Robust z-statistics in
parentheses, clustered at the level of the state. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant
at 1%. Rather than the coe¢ cients, we report the change in the probability for an innitesimal change in
each independent, continuous variable and, by default, the discrete change in the probability for dummy
variables. Multipliers dened as the inverse of the probability that the observation is included due to
the sampling design are used as weights in the regressions.
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Table 2: The impact of pendency on the probability of working on a contract basis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable contract1 relationship-specic investment contract2
pendency percentage of total 0.1080 -0.0231 -0.1255 -0.1837 -0.1144
cases in High Courts in 1999 (1.63) (0.18) (2.45)** (3.61)*** (1.89)*
state-level controls yes no yes yes yes
rm-level controls yes no no yes yes
sector dummies (NIC2) yes no no no yes
Observations 166085 12295 12295 12011 11989
1 =1 if the entreprise works on a contract basis; =0 otherwise.  2 =1 if the entreprise undertakes a relationship-
specic investment contract; =0 otherwise (restricted to the entreprises working on a contract basis). a relationship-
specic investment contract is dened as a contract where the design is specied by the contractor and when the
equipment/raw material is supplied by the master unit/contractor. Probit regressions. Robust z-statistics in paren-
theses, clustered at the level of the state. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Rather
than the coe¢ cients, we report the change in the probability for an innitesimal change in each independent, con-
tinuous variable and, by default, the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables. Multipliers dened as
the inverse of the probability that the observation is included due to the sampling design are used as weights in the
regressions.
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Table 4: The impact of pendency on types of ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable dynasty1
pendency percentage of total 0.2937 0.4487 0.3118 0.2937
cases in High Courts in 1999 (1.04) (2.92)*** (1.97)** (2.14)**
state-level controls no yes yes yes
rm-level controls no no yes yes
sector dummies (NIC2) no no no yes
Observations 3619 3619 3540 3535
 There are two possible types of partnership: partnership with members of the same household
and partnership between members not all from the same household. 1dynasty=1 if the type of
partnership is with members of the same household; =0 otherwise. Probit regressions. Robust
z-statistics in parentheses, clustered at the level of the state. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant
at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Rather than the coe¢ cients, we report the change in the probability
for an innitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable and, by default, the discrete
change in the probability for dummy variables.Multipliers dened as the inverse of the probability
that the observation is included due to the sampling design are used as weights in the regressions.
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